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Abstract: We analyze the interaction of climate and development policy that has 
taken place since the early 1990s. Increasing dissatisfaction about the results of 
traditional development cooperation and the appeal of climate policy as a new 
policy field led to a rapid reorientation of aid flows. At the turn of the century, over 
7% of aid flows were spent on greenhouse gas emissions mitigation. However, the 
contribution of emissions mitigation projects to the central development objective 
of poverty reduction as specified in the Millennium Development Goals is limited 
and other project types are likely to be much more effective. Adaptation to climate 
change can be expected to have higher synergies with poverty alleviation than 
mitigation, primarily through its impact on health, the conservation of arable land 
and the protection against natural disasters. An analysis of the Clean Development 
Mechanism shows that projects addressing the poor directly are very rare; even 
small renewable energy projects in rural areas tend to benefit rich farmers and the 
urban population. Use of development aid for CDM projects and / or their 
preparation via capacity building is thus clearly not warranted. 
 
We further analyze whether the use of development aid for climate policy could be 
justified as a countermeasure against the emission increase related to successful 
development itself. However, countries that are achieving an improvement of 
human development from a low level are unlikely to increase their energy 
consumption substantially. Only at a level where middle class expands rapidly, 
energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions soar. Thus targeting middle 
class energy consumption by appliance efficiency standards and public transport-
friendly urban planning are the most effective measures to address developing 
country emissions. Rural renewable energy provision in poor countries has a much 
higher impact on poverty, but a much lower impact on greenhouse gas emissions.  
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We conclude that while there are valid reasons for long-term collaboration with 
emerging economies on greenhouse gas mitigation, there should be a separate 
budget line for such activities to avoid “obfuscation” of a decline of resources aimed 
at poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, mitigation will remain attractive for donors 
because it ensures quick disbursements and relatively simple measures of success. 
Moreover, mitigation activities in developing countries provide politicians in 
industrialized countries with a welcome strategy to distract their constituencies 
from the lack of success in reducing greenhouse gas emissions domestically. 
 
Key words: ODA, climate policy, poverty reduction, MDGs, CDM, mitigation, 
adaptation 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Development cooperation has been a traditional policy field ever since the 1950s 
when the vision of propelling poor countries to industrialization and the success of 
large capital transfers in rebuilding Europe led to the first large-scale financial 
transfers to the South. The period of large investment projects was followed by an 
emphasis on social sector development, with a direct focus on the poor, which was 
enthusiastically embraced by significant parts of the population in industrialized 
countries, and led to the voluntary commitment of all industrialized countries in 
1970 to each spend 0.7% of GDP on development assistance. 
 
However, it became apparent during the 1980s that most of the development funds 
had generated neither the expected growth nor the improvement of general wealth 
and social conditions. The development community reacted by developing new 
paradigms, like the focus on “pro-poor growth” from the mid 1990s onwards, and 
the definition of the “Millenium Development Goals” (MDGs) to eradicate poverty. 
Despite all efforts, these reorientations were widely conceived as hardly convincing. 
Many observers wondered whether they might represent no more than “old wine in 
new bottles” (Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2002), i.e. little truly substantial 
change (Easterly 2002). From the end of the 1980s onwards, the development 
literature no longer looked forward, but started acknowledging “the failure of the 
grand theories” (Menzel 1992). Aid agencies, donor country politicians and 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) started to feel an “aid 
fatigue”, i.e. growing disinterest among their constituencies. The vast majority of 
donor countries never reached the 0.7% commitment, but steadily increased their 
distance from the target. 
 
Parallel to this, since the late 1980s, international climate policy has emerged as a 
new major area of policy making. Environmental issues in general had become a 
central issue of public interest in industrialized countries, reflected in the creation of 
environmental NGOs and even new parties like the German “Greens”. The UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio (1992) simultaneously 
addressed both development policy and environmental policy, with a particular 
emphasis on international climate policy. Ever since Rio, donor countries have used 
development funds at least partially for climate policy purposes (OECD/DAC 2002a). 
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In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol defined legally binding greenhouse gas emission 
commitments for all industrialized countries. The Protocol allows these countries to 
get emission credits (Certified Emission Reductions, CERs) from projects which 
reduce greenhouse gases in developing countries via the “Clean Development 
Mechanism” (CDM). This further increased the linkages between climate and 
development policy and opened up new fields of activities for aid agencies, e.g. in 
terms of capacity building. To a certain extent, one may feel that the young and 
dynamic field of climate policy has taken over (parts of) the old, traditional and 
somewhat dusty field of development policy. Such developments may be 
problematic in terms of conflicting objectives or priorities, especially as the central 
goal of development policy to eradicate poverty (now codified in the MDGs) remains 
valid and is a central humanitarian challenge for mankind as a whole - despite all 
drawbacks on implementation.. 
 
It is the objective of this paper to trace these developments, and to assess whether 
climate policy related aid financing is used in conformity with the major 
development objectives. Can development assistance allotted to climate policy be 
considered as a genuine part of development aid, and could it possibly help to 
achieve development objectives unachieved so far by classical development 
cooperation? Or has it been introduced as a substitute, diverting resources from the 
core development objectives? Does development assistance allotted to climate 
policy really promote development, or is it primarily used by industrialized 
countries to reach their own climate policy objectives? As the Kyoto Protocol only 
entered into force in 2005, and industrialized countries find it more and more 
difficult to reach their emission targets, the relevance of the issues discussed here is 
likely to continue to increase in the near future. 
 
Prior research on these issues is rather scarce. In a game theoretical model, Caparrós 
and Pereau (2005) assess the interaction between mitigation and development 
assistance. They find that increasing mitigation reduces the ODA level in the long 
run, while short run dynamics might lead to a transitional increase in both 
mitigation and ODA, for an initial time period. Our own approach is purely 
empirical. We attempt to take stock of the current situation using existing data for 
development aid and emission reduction activities, and to confront them with 
donor deliberations on the objectives and achievements of their policies.  
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In section 2, we assess to what extent climate policy has already been reflected in 
aid flows until now. In section 3, we investigate the role of climate policy in 
attaining core development objectives, as reflected in the MDGs. In this context, we 
consider both the effect of climate policy on MDGs and the impact which the 
pursuit of MDGs may have on greenhouse gas emissions, thereby calling for 
countervailing measures. Finally, section 4 explores other reasons such as problems 
of absorptive capacity in recipient countries and genuine donor interests, which 
may also explain the use of development resources for climate policy measures. 
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2.  The relevance of climate change activities in current 
development cooperation 
 
Between 1998 and 2000, the members of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) spent 2.7 billion USD or 7.2% of total bilateral Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) for climate change related activities (OECD/DAC 
2002b)1. In the three countries Finland, Germany and Japan, this share exceeded 
10%. In addition, around 320 million USD were spent as multilateral ODA for the 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which uses about one third of its funds for 
climate change related projects. Overall, from 1991-2005, the GEF has spent 
approximately 2 billion USD on projects related to climate change (GEF 2005a).  
 
According to the World Bank (2005, p. 7), renewable energy and energy efficiency 
projects financed by development assistance have been significant, but with high 
inter-annual variation, ever since the early 1990s. For earlier years, such data is 
generally not available. This may in itself be a reflection of the low interest in the 
topic before the Rio Conference. For World Bank data, for example, the potentially 
relevant categories “energy and mining”, “environment” and “rural development” 
do not make it possible to determine whether the project was promoting renewable 
energy. The project could also not have any energy component or relate to fossil 
fuels. 
 
However, there are several specific project categories that have clearly been 
relevant for several decades: Hydro-power projects have been relevant ever since 
colonization, simply as a cost-efficient source of energy. As hydro-power projects 
have often led to (heavily criticized) adverse development effects induced by 
resettlements, irregular flooding or inadequate technical maintenance capacity, 
their importance decreased over time. At the same time, small renewable energy 
projects became fashionable after the second oil shock in the late 1970s (Müller-
Pelzer and Michaelowa 2005). As hydro-power projects have typically been very 
large, the thematic focus on climate change policy from the 1990s onward has not 
necessarily led to higher expenditures for renewable energy as a whole. However, 
the variety of projects and their direct focus on greenhouse gas emission reduction 
has risen considerably.  
 
                                                 
1 Data refer to all members except European Commission, Italy and Luxemburg who did not report.  
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Figures 1 and 2 provide an overview of the corresponding developments in German 
ODA projects for which this information was available. Figure 1 shows the 
development of the aid volume spent on projects reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. It reflects the large year-by-year variation already mentioned above, and, 
possibly, a slight upward trend on average. When looking at this overall trend, the 
extremely low values for the most recent years should be interpreted with caution, 
since not all project information was available at the time this paper was prepared. 
High figures for the late 1970s / early 1980s reflect the reaction to the second oil 
crisis. If these special considerations are taken into account, the data reveals that 
the Rio Conference in 1992 was followed by a significant increase in funding for 
climate related activities – at least as compared to an ordinary non-oil shock 
scenario, and in the case of German ODA.  
 
Figure 1: Projects reducing greenhouse gases in the German ODA portfolio (million €) 
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Source: Hamburg Institute of International Economics. For details see Müller-Pelzer and Michaelowa 
(2005). 
 
Figure 2 presents the share of different project categories within the overall aid 
volume devoted to these activities. It highlights the predominance of hydro-power 
until the late 1980s and the important diversification thereafter, with afforestation 
playing a particularly important role. Most of the other project categories are 
financially less voluminous. Given this new project mix, it is remarkable that 
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overall German ODA funding of projects which reduce greenhouse gases increased 
in the 1990s.  
 
Figure 2: Share of different projects categories within the total volume of projects reducing 
greenhouse gases in the German ODA portfolio 
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Source: Hamburg Institute of International Economics. For details see Müller-Pelzer and Michaelowa 
(2005). 
 
Climate change related activities have therefore become not only a highly relevant, 
but also a highly diversified part of development cooperation during the last 
decade. In addition to the above mentioned projects, with a clear focus on the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, development cooperation activities 
encompass adaptation measures to climate change, in particular to sea-level rise 
and desertification. Unfortunately, no reliable data is available to quantify the 
development of these activities over time.  
 
It should be noted that almost all climate change related activities in developing 
countries can be financed with development assistance. While there was a lively 
debate about “additionality” of resources before the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the practical definition adopted in April 2004 by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) only excludes those CDM activities which 
governments directly use to purchase CERs (OECD/DAC 2004). This implies that 
alternative interpretations of additionality, in particular a quantitative minimum 
requirement for traditional development assistance, oriented either at the baseline 
of current spending or at the 0.7% target, has effectively been ruled out (Dutschke 
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and Michaelowa 2006). The consequence is that there is no limitation to the use of 
ODA funds for climate related activities. 
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3.  The role of climate policy in attaining core development 
objectives  
 
As climate related activities are a significant, increasing and potentially 
unrestricted part of ODA, they should be geared towards the same objectives. 
Development objectives have been clearly defined and codified in the MDGs, which 
were derived from the United Nations Millennium Declaration, and endorsed by 189 
industrialized and developing countries in 2000. While they represent a major 
objective for all fields of international policy, and for national policy making within 
developing countries, development cooperation is supposed to be most clearly 
geared towards these objectives. Therefore, when considering the role of climate 
policy within ODA, the most obvious test it has to pass is whether it contributes to 
the achievement of the MDGs.  
 
3.1  Millennium Development Goals 
The MDGs have been developed in order to obtain measurable targets for poverty 
reduction. They represent a multi-facetted framework, allowing for a multi-
dimensional definition of poverty, although the reduction of income poverty has 
the predominant position of goal no. 1, and is an expected indirect outcome of the 
achievement of most other goals. As the overarching concern is poverty eradication, 
all individual objectives, targets and indicators have to be interpreted from this 
perspective. It should be kept in mind that the use of quantifiable targets might 
stress some facets of poverty more than others, so that generally, a somewhat wider 
interpretation is considered as adequate. Nevertheless, formulations are clear, and 
the overall success in meeting the development challenge encoded in the MDGs will 
ultimately have to be measured in terms of the pre-defined quantitative indicators. 
In detail, the eight MDGs are (UN 2005): 
 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Targets: (i) Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is  
less than $1 a day 
(ii) Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from 
hunger 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Target:  Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be 
able to  
complete a full course of primary schooling 
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Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target:  Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by  
2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015 
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality 
Target:  Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality 
rate 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 
Target: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality ratio 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases  
Targets: (i) Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
(ii) Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria 
and  
other major diseases 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Targets: (i) Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and  
programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources 
(ii) Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the people without sustainable 
access to  
safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
(iii) By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of 
at least 100 million slum-dwellers 
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development 
Targets:  (i) Address the special needs of the least developed countries,  
landlocked countries and small island developing states 
(ii) Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-
discriminatory trading and financial system 
(iii) Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt 
(iv) In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement 
strategies for decent and productive work for youth 
(v) In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries 
(vi) In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits 
of new technologies, especially information and communications 
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Looking at this long list of goals and targets, the link to climate policies is obvious at 
first glance only for goal 7, target 1, but not so much for any other objective. 
However, donor documents highlight many more linkages between climate policy 
and these core development objectives. 
 
3.2  Climate policy as an instrument to reach the MDGs  
Considering each of the MDGs carefully, one does indeed discover many ways in 
which climate policy related activities may help to reach the goals listed above. A 
group of multilateral and bilateral donor agencies produced a joint study to 
highlight these linkages, specifically with respect to adaptation measures (AfDB et 
al. 2003). As mentioned above, the relationship with goal 7 is obvious because 
climate change directly damages the ecosystems and many natural resources, 
whose stability would be a prerequisite for economic development. With respect to 
other goals, it can be noted that the risk of sea level rise, desertification and 
irregular rainfall induced by climate change is particularly strong for many poor 
countries, especially coastal countries, small island states and the countries in the 
Sahel zone. This will reduce food security and destroy productive assets such as 
arable land, infrastructure, housing, etc. Helping countries to adapt to projected 
changes through, for instance, the construction of dams, the use of new irrigation 
methods or the introduction of adapted crops will therefore clearly be beneficial to 
goal 1. Moreover, adaptation may reduce the threat of civil and cross-border conflict 
over increasingly scarce resources such as land and water.  
 
The relevance of adaptation for health related goals 4-6 becomes clear if one 
considers the projected impact of climate change on vector born diseases, e.g. 
dengue fever or malaria, which is particularly dangerous for pregnant women and 
young children. Moreover, climate change will reduce the availability of clean 
drinking water and thus increase the cases of diarrhea with often fatal 
consequences especially for children. Consequences for women are often worse 
than for men: Mothers’ burden is increased; they have to care for the ill children and 
go longer distances to fetch fresh water for their household activities. In case of 
sickness, girls are often sent to the doctor at a later stage than boys, sometimes too 
late. This creates a link to goal 3. Moreover, the empirical literature shows a negative 
indirect link between ill health and education, as well as between poverty and 
education in general (see e.g. Michaelowa 2001a and 2001b). Thus, indirectly, even 
goal 2 is concerned. And finally, global partnerships, as called for by goal 8, 
encompass the cooperation between developed and developing countries to help 
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the latter to adjust to the adverse effects of climate change. Cooperation with small 
island states is specifically mentioned under target 1. 
 
Similar to the donor agencies’ report on adaptation, the GEF recently produced a 
study demonstrating the impact of all of its activities (including climate change) on 
the MDGs (GEF 2005a). First and foremost, it is underscored that through the 
channels already mentioned above, climate change will strongly increase the 
vulnerability of the poor. While adaptation to this change may mitigate the adverse 
effects, any direct measures to stop or reduce climate change will, by the same 
token, be directly beneficial to those who would otherwise be under threat. 
Moreover, many of the activities introduced to substitute for the use of fossil energy 
specifically benefit the poor. First, renewable energy can be more easily introduced 
in remote areas than conventional energy. The related access to electricity enhances 
agricultural productivity, improves the quality of health care, facilitates learning (in 
school and at home) and eases women’s tasks at home. Second, clean energy will 
save millions of women and children from indoor air pollution, which is known to 
cause serious, often life threatening, respiratory infections. This creates linkages of 
GEF activities to goals 1 to 6. The same applies when similar projects are carried out 
by bilateral donor agencies under the CDM. 
 
From the above discussion it is obvious that some examples of climate related 
activities can be found for virtually all of the MDGs. However, a justification of ODA 
financed climate policy requires more than these examples. In fact, doing justice to 
the MDGs is a matter of setting priorities for those policies that will most efficiently 
achieve these goals. For instance, when it comes to the objective of universal 
primary education (goal 2), obviously we can construct an impact chain from 
electrification of a community, which results in r improved learning, lower drop out 
rates, and finally in higher enrolment. But the most efficient way to achieve 
universal primary education is certainly not via electrification of rural school and 
households. Other measures, such as an increased supply of teachers, a reduction of 
repetition rates or the provision of school meals will be far more effective (see e.g. 
Glewwe and Kremer 2006, Bourdon, Frölich and Michaelowa 2006; Bernard, Simon 
and Vianou 2005). Similarly, for all other goals except goal 7, climate change related 
activities would not usually be considered as having the highest potential impact 
on poverty.  
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This becomes most evident if one looks at the development literature about 
progress towards the MDGs. In this literature, the priorities mentioned to reach 
these goals only show very little overlap with climate policy related activities. In the 
UN (2005) report, the focus with respect to goal 1 is on growth, particularly via 
increased agricultural productivity, and with a strong regional emphasis on sub-
Saharan Africa. With respect to both goal 1 and 2, it also becomes clear that reducing 
population growth would have a strongly positive effect. Suggested measures to 
promote gender equality (goal 3) range from quotas for seats in parliaments to safe 
transportation, separate toilets for boys and girls and removing gender stereotypes 
from the classroom, in order to ensure female enrolment and retention in school. 
More than 50% of child mortality (goal 4) is caused by malnutrition, which refers 
back to agricultural productivity. Otherwise, goal 4 calls for better health services, 
safe water and better sanitation. Half of all deaths of children under 5 are caused by 
pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, measles and AIDS, and most of them could be 
avoided by low cost measures such as exclusive breastfeeding for infants, 
antibiotics for acute respiratory infections, oral rehydration for diarrhea, 
immunization or the use of insecticide-treated mosquito-nets and appropriate drugs 
for malaria (UN 2005, p. 19). Similar measures are called for in the context of general 
health care (goal 6) while for maternal health (goal 5), the successful strategy of 
ensuring skilled birth attendants is emphasized. The regional emphasis is again on 
sub-Saharan Africa, but also on Southern Asia.  
 
The discussion of progress towards goal 7, on environmental sustainability, 
explicitly considers the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, efforts to combat 
deforestation through sustainable forest management and an increase in energy 
efficiency, but also issues such as biodiversity, the use of ozone-depleting 
substances, access to safe drinking water and sanitation and the living conditions of 
slum dwellers. With respect to greenhouse gas emission reduction, the presentation 
underscores that the greatest effort is required within industrialized countries. 
Finally, with respect to strengthening international cooperation (goal 8), the UN 
document stresses development aid and debt relief as well as international trade 
policies, in particular the still unsettled problems of agricultural subsidies in 
industrialized countries and the remaining high tariffs on clothing, agricultural 
products and textiles. Moreover it highlights the necessity of further cooperation 
between public authorities and private firms to enhance the availability of essential 
drugs against diseases such as AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis and / or the 
availability of necessary ingredients to prepare these drugs. Other issues are the 
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spread of information technologies and the attempt to fight youth unemployment, 
in order to reduce the risk of social unrest. Overall, climate policy related activities 
appear to play a minor and rather insignificant role in this report. 
 
The situation is similar if one examines other publications. The economic literature 
on poverty reduction and pro-poor growth typically focuses on a mix of 
macroeconomic and governance issues, while pointing out labor intensive 
agricultural productivity and employment strategies when it comes to the 
definition of sectoral priorities (Klasen 2004, Mosley and Suleiman 2006). And even 
in the GEF’s (2005a) MDG progress report which covers only environmental policies, 
climate change related projects are cited less frequently than other GEF activities, 
especially activities against land degradation - a focus which is well in line with the 
priorities highlighted in the other studies mentioned above. 
 
All in all, the available evidence shows that only few areas exist in which climate 
and development priorities truly overlap. Examining these areas in somewhat more 
detail suggests the following conclusions: 
 
• Goal 7, target 1 directly includes climate change activities, but it is one of those 
targets in which industrialized rather than developing countries are called to 
improve their own national policies. The effect of international agreements to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions is relevant only in a long-term perspective and 
requires substantial financial investments from the countries concerned. For all 
these reasons, goal 7 cannot provide any justification for ODA financing of 
climate policy activities. 
• Apart from goal 7, obvious linkages between measures of climate policy and 
poverty eradication can be seen in the fight against malaria and other vector-
borne diseases, and in protective measures against sea-level rise, floods, 
droughts, storms and agricultural crop failures caused by climate change. All of 
these measures would fall into the category of “adaptation”. There is an obvious 
case for financing these policies with ODA, and in fact, development agencies 
have put an increasing emphasis on integrating adaptation activities into their 
project portfolio (AfDB et al. 2005). However, except for some technical 
measures, such as building sea-walls or dedicated early warning systems for 
new types of meteorological extremes, it appears impossible to distinguish these 
activities from similar (or identical) development policies that are unrelated to 
climate change. 
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• The only measure directly reducing greenhouse gas emissions in developing 
countries and simultaneously constituting a priority for poverty alleviation is 
the reduction of indoor pollution via the introduction of clean energy. This 
would reduce the occurrence of respiratory diseases and could clearly be 
financed through ODA. Moreover, these policies would be suitable candidates for 
small-scale CDM projects. 
 
It has been argued that all the measures discussed above are climate change related 
activities which simultaneously fulfill the criterion to be high priority measures for 
development. It remains to be determined, however, what their priority is within 
overall climate change activities. If climate change related policies in developing 
countries are to be financed with ODA, not only the objectives of some marginal 
activities, but the overall direction must converge. 
 
With respect to adaptation, this may in fact be true. However, with respect to CDM, 
the provision of clean energy to rural households is rare. Of 402 projects available on 
the CDM Executive Board’s website on Nov 3, 2005, only 8 projects explicitly address 
rural energy provision. Another 50 biomass power projects with capacities of 3-10 
MW, using agricultural wastes such as rice husk, generate indirect benefits for the 
rural population. Due to the demand for the agricultural wastes, farmers can now 
sell them to power plant operators and increase their income. In India, prices for rice 
husk have quadrupled over the last three years. However, it is likely that the major 
share of agricultural wastes will come from wealthy farmers (being proportional to 
production levels) and that the poor, landless rural population will only marginally 
benefit. 46 small hydro plants of a few MW are built in rural areas and thus could 
provide intermittent benefits through job creation and electricity provision for the 
surrounding villages. However, in most cases, the power will be delivered to the 
cities and migrant labor employed for the construction work, which in turn will lead 
to conflicts about water use. So the development impact for the direct vicinity of the 
plant may on average be negative. 
 
Greenhouse gas emission reduction projects, unlike rural renewable electricity 
generation, are by far more efficient. First, rural households often do not have much 
energy consumption anyway, at least as long as they do not benefit from electricity. 
Second, large scale projects can typically be carried out at a lower cost for the same 
level of outcome in terms of emission reduction (scale effects). And third, 
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cooperation with large private sector firms or energy providers may bring about 
relevant contacts and other forms of indirect benefits for the investor. 
 
With respect to regional priorities, these aspects can be expected to be relevant, too. 
While poverty reduction requires a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, more developed middle income countries in other regions of the world 
(particularly in East Asia, but also in Latin America or Europe and Central Asia) 
might well be more attractive investment locations. In addition, the poorest 
countries have the least capacity to even create their Designated National Authority 
(DNA) which is a precondition for the implementation of CDM activities. For the 
time being, these agencies do not exist for large parts of sub-Saharan Africa. While 
over 35 million € have been spent on CDM capacity and institution building, only a 
small part flowed to sub-Saharan African countries or LDCs. Most funds focused on 
the large emerging economies (Michaelowa 2004). 
 
Figure 3 presents an overview of GEF funding for climate policy projects by region. 
As the GEF is a multilateral agency, the regional spread can be assumed to reflect 
environmental priorities without too much distortion from direct bilateral country 
or business interest. Nevertheless, the figure clearly shows that GEF financing 
priorities are not identical with those formulated for the fight against poverty. The 
bulk of GEF investment (i.e. a total of 34%) flows to Asian countries, whereby South 
Asia only receives about one fourth of the overall resources for the continent. Data 
for individual recipient countries reveals that China alone receives about half of all 
resources spent on the continent. Latin America and the Caribbean receive 23%, 
while Africa (including North Africa) receives only 19% of GEF climate policy 
funding.  
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Figure 3: Regional shares of GEF climate policy funding (1991-2005)  
 
 
Data source: GEF (2005b). 
 
The geographical distribution of flows reflects the existing differences in priorities 
of climate change policies and poverty reduction and also the lack of technical 
capacity in Africa. A region with few industrial activities, little transport 
infrastructure and circulation and even low electrification, as in major parts of sub-
Saharan Africa, simply offers less investment opportunities for large-scale emission 
reduction activities. It is interesting to see that in terms of GEF project numbers, 
Africa is in fact the continent where the most activities take place. But about two 
thirds are only capacity building measures which do not absorb much financial 
resources and do not necessarily imply any concrete policy action.  
 
The distribution of the 402 CDM projects publicly available on the UNFCCC website 
on November 3, 2005, is even more skewed against Africa. However, the share of 
South Asia is higher than the distribution of GEF projects (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Regional shares of CDM projects (numbers of projects) 
 
 
Data source: UNFCCC (2005). 
 
When one looks at the estimated amount of CERs, Africa’s share is minuscule (see 
Figure 5). While South Asia is well-represented on both counts, the majority of 
projects will not have significant direct benefits for the poor, as discussed above. 
 
Figure 5: Regional shares of CDM projects (CERs estimated until 2012) 
 
Data source: UNFCCC (2005). 
 
Overall, the available evidence suggests that within climate change activities, those 
mentioned above as having a particularly strong poverty impact do not play a 
major role. Those measures most efficient for global emission reduction will not 
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usually be simultaneously most efficient with respect to poverty reduction. Given 
budget restrictions, it is important to be aware of this conflict and to define policy 
priorities. 
 
And things may be worse: So far, the discussion has covered projects with at least 
some complementary effect for both objectives. However, there may also be projects 
which have a direct harmful effect on one objective. The construction of huge 
hydropower plants in densely populated areas could be an example. Emissions 
could be reduced, but at the same time, resettlements, social unrest and the loss of 
housing and productive assets would induce negative effects on poverty. Moreover, 
bilateral donors might select their climate related activities based on the additional 
objective to reap direct benefits by obtaining CERs. While DAC regulations clearly 
define that projects which directly lead to CERs will not be counted as ODA (at least 
retrospectively), there is ample scope for preparatory action. Increasingly, ODA 
activities to support renewable energy and energy efficiency projects have been 
used to “graft” CDM programs. A typical example is Danish development assistance. 
Denmark financed a broad energy program in Malaysia. This was then followed by 
a CDM capacity building exercise, which then was replicated in Thailand and 
Indonesia (Danida 2004). A key component of these programs is the development of 
projects that can generate cheap CERs for Denmark. It states bluntly that “these 
efforts will lead to synergy between development, global environment and the 
government’s aim of securing a cost-efficient fulfillment of Denmark’s obligations 
towards the global climate” (Danida 2004, p. 21). Clearly, the prime objective of such 
ODA activities is neither poverty reduction, nor emission reduction for its own right.  
 
Last but not least, the well-known negative impact which growth and industrial 
development typically have on greenhouse gas emissions must also not be 
overlooked. There thus exist multiple complementarities, but also multiple conflicts, 
between the objectives of climate and development policy. 
 
Admitting that the objectives of emission reduction and development are not 
always compatible, ODA financing, which should in fact be oriented towards the 
MDGs, becomes questionable. At the same time, once the issue of at least partially 
conflicting objectives is recognized, one may ask from the perspective of climate 
policy, whether another justification of using ODA could not be the mitigation of 
adverse effects of development policies on greenhouse gas emissions. 
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3.3  Measures to reduce the greenhouse gas emission impacts of 
reaching the MDGs 
It is a fact that highly developed societies have higher energy consumption – and 
thus greenhouse gas emissions - than those on a low development level. However, 
there is no linear correlation between human development and energy use. 
Generally, development indicators can improve rapidly from low levels with only 
small increases in per capita energy use. Only when countries reach an 
intermediate level of development, energy use starts to grow rapidly while 
improvement in development indicators slows down (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Changes of Human Development Index and per capita energy use for selected 
countries, 1990-2000 
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Source: UNDP (2005), p. 6. 
 
This seems to suggest that reaching the MDGs would not necessarily entail high 
increases in greenhouse gas emissions as the largest gains could be made in 
countries that are still on the left-hand side of Figure 6. However, if one looks at the 
large countries China and India that have made the most substantial progress 
towards the MDGs during the last decade, one finds that they have increased their 
energy consumption considerably, which has in turn led to a rapid increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions. This may be due to the fact that in these countries the 
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improvement of the poverty and education indicators is due to a trickle-down effect 
of general economic growth which leads to a rapid increase of middle-income strata 
in the society. Typically, these middle income strata quickly adopt energy-intensive 
lifestyles. This is documented by the explosive growth in electricity-consuming 
household appliances and private cars in China and all over South East Asia. The 
same phenomenon is now starting in India, too. 
 
The challenge is therefore not that specific measures to reach the MDGs are 
emissions intensive, but that MDG indicator improvement is often the (indirect) 
result of a take-off of middle-class lifestyles. To curb emissions growth in countries 
that achieve the MDGs, it would be sensible to address middle-class energy use by 
introducing appliance efficiency standards and public transport systems, as well as 
urban policies that discourage car use. Electrifying rural schools and hospitals, 
villages or small rural enterprises with renewable energy sources or furnishing 
them with the latest energy-efficient equipment would be much less efficient in 
this respect. 
 
It should be noted that the window of opportunity for appliance energy standards 
stands open only for a short period, because once saturation with appliances has 
been reached, replacement will take a long time. While for China, the window of 
opportunity seems to have closed already, in India it should remain open for 
another decade. With respect to car use, several examples portray the emission 
reduction potential of preventive policy strategies. The Brazilian city of Curitiba was 
able to keep car use at 25% of comparable cities by developing an urban master-plan 
that prevented urban sprawl and a high-capacity public bus system (Rabinovitch 
and Leitman 1996). In Tokyo, Seoul, Singapore and Hong Kong, early restraint of car 
ownership and/or use, which began before car ownership reached 100 cars per 
thousand people, provided a time period in which high quality public transport 
could be built, and in which a transit-friendly urban structure could develop (Barter 
and Kenworthy 1997). 
 
These examples show that effective climate policy to reduce the impact of economic 
development and growth on greenhouse gas emissions typically implies targeting 
middle income classes, as well as countries in an early take-off situation, rather 
than the poorest of the poor. If ODA is used for the mitigation of adverse effects of 
development policies on greenhouse gas emissions, the regional spread as observed 
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above may therefore be justified. However, it should be kept in mind that this 
objective is clearly not identical with the prime objective of eradicating poverty. 
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4.  Other political and economic reasons for financing climate 
policy with development resources 
 
Having examined the impact of climate change related activities on poverty, it 
might seem appropriate to also examine the actual poverty relevance of aid in 
general. While poverty eradication has been officially set up as the central objective 
of aid, this does not necessarily imply that donors act accordingly. In fact, ever since 
the late 1970s, a large and growing amount of empirical literature on the 
geographical distribution of aid has clearly established that donors strive for a 
multitude of different (and partially conflicting) objectives. Aims such as export 
promotion, political and cultural hegemony, etc. are frequently given priority over 
recipient needs. The reasons can often be found in the political economy of 
individual donor countries: bureaucratic procedures which create incentives to 
spend a maximum amount of money within a restricted budget year, electoral 
processes which cannot be won with the objective of international poverty 
reduction, and lobbying by private firms that regard aid as an interesting pool for 
indirect subsidies (for the political economy of aid, see Lahiri and Michaelowa 2006). 
It seems, however, that the development focus of aid has improved in recent years 
(Berthélemy 2006, Berthélemy and Tichit 2004). Looking simply at the regional 
spread of country allocations as presented in OECD/DAC (2005, Statistical Annex, 
Table 27) it can be observed that bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa increased from 
28.5 % in 1992-93 to 34.5 % in 2002-03. Including multilateral ODA, the share of gross 
disbursements to sub-Saharan Africa for 2002-03 is 36.8%. All these figures, 
including those for the early 1990s, are much higher than those observed for climate 
change related activities. All in all, the regional allocation of overall ODA seems to 
be much more poverty oriented than the spread of emission reduction activities in 
developing countries. 
 
Nevertheless, even with respect to general ODA, a high share of resources remains 
to be spent on less poor regions and for policies with little obvious poverty 
relevance. Even after controlling for factors like good governance, which are 
expected to have an impact on aid effectiveness and might therefore make a 
slightly better-off recipient country preferable to a very poor bad performer, this 
criticism remains valid for a substantial number of bilateral donors (Berthélemy 
2006). ODA financed climate policy activities are thus not the only part of 
development finance where one might wonder about priorities.  
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Apart from the political economy motives already mentioned above, a potential 
reason for ODA financed climate policy seems to be that it is simply extremely 
difficult to find enough promising projects and programs for large-scale ODA 
investment in poverty reduction. The mechanisms and incentives relevant for a 
kick-start to self-sustaining development are often so complicated that easy 
solutions may cause the opposite of what was initially intended. While aid has to be 
targeted to poor countries, incentives to remain poor in order to receive more aid (or 
debt relief) are to be avoided. Moreover, it must be avoided that governments take 
advantage of the inflows of aid to use their own resources for activities unrelated or 
even detrimental to development (e.g. military expenditure). In fact, large-scale 
projects and programs with an unambiguously positive, significant and lasting 
development impact are relatively rare.  
 
Given the problems with aid disbursements and the low absorptive capacity of the 
most clearly poverty focused activities, it may be that ODA spent on activities with 
other prime objectives (such as emission reductions) is simply a way to avoid ODA 
budget cuts as long as more poverty focused spending options do not exist. 
Developing new promising ideas is not only a very difficult and time consuming 
task, but also a task for which success cannot be guaranteed. It is easier to spend 
resources on activities in middle income countries with established government 
structures that promise an effective absorption of ODA resources, than to 
painstakingly develop a poverty alleviation project in a sub-Saharan LDC from 
scratch. Climate policy activities have been able to provide quick flows of ODA 
funds, and it was relatively easy to define indicators for success, e.g. for programs 
supporting CDM institution building. As some good examples can be given for their 
positive impact on development objectives, few observers will recognize the 
problem of conflicting priorities. Coming back to a political-economic consideration 
of aid expenditure, this implies that development agencies and politicians 
responsible for this field do not need to fear too much criticism from the general 
public. On the contrary, the dedication of ODA funds to climate policy activities may 
be doubly rewarding: The “development community” will appreciate the 
stabilization of the overall aid budget and the “climate community” will appreciate 
the effort from an environmental perspective. In fact, the outcome can be “sold” in 
two different policy fields. 
 
Satisfying the “climate community” has in fact otherwise become increasingly 
difficult. Since the mid 1990s, policymakers in industrialized countries are starting 
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to recognize that domestic greenhouse gas emission reductions go against the 
interests of powerful interest groups in key industrial sectors. At the same time, 
energy efficiency improvements in the household, commercial and transport sector 
are eaten up by new appliances, larger average flat sizes, more comfortable room 
temperatures and more powerful car engines. Therefore, the initial hopes of 
achieving far-reaching emission reduction targets through exploitation of a 
business-as-usual “dematerialization” trend have been dashed. As policymakers 
(with the exception of the US administration) recognize that climate change cannot 
just be ignored and voters do care about the impacts of climate change, three main 
strategies have evolved: 
 
1. Keep greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries as low as possible 
(while not stifling their development). This should also boost exports of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. The CDM can be the 
first step of this strategy, but should be expanded considerably after 2012. As 
any long-term climate policy strategy needs involvement of the emerging 
economies, financial incentives are necessary to induce them to eventually 
agree to quantitative emission targets. 
2. Hope for the miracle technology that allows deep reductions without 
impacting energy consumption. Currently, carbon capture and sequestration 
from fossil power plants is playing this role (Michaelowa 2005). The problem 
with this strategy is that it is unclear when the targeted technology will 
actually deliver, if at all. 
3. Adapt to climate change, given the increased impacts of meteorological 
extreme events. Developing countries should be given some visible support 
in this to achieve continued participation in the international climate 
negotiations. 
 
As development assistance has no powerful lobby, there is a good case for 
policymakers to push the first strategy by using development funds. Recently, a 
discussion among officials of different German ministries was framed in these 
terms (Altenburg et al. 2005). The strategy aims at the large emerging economies, 
not the poor countries that should be the focus of a poverty-reducing, MDG-oriented 
strategy. For least developed countries, the focus would be on adaptation activities. 
Assistance in emerging economies should focus on the following activities: 
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• Catalyzing policy reform to abolish policies that favor energy wastage and 
fossil fuel. A good example is the support of the Bureau for Energy Efficiency 
(BEE) at the Ministry of Power in India by GTZ. The BEE played a crucial role in 
the passing of the Energy Efficiency Act that could play a key role in 
improving the often dismal efficiency of Indian industry. 
• Help in implementation of new policies favoring renewables. German 
assistance supported the recent renewable energy legislation in China. 
• Efficiency increases in situations where a huge increase in electricity demand 
leads to the need to expand generation capacities at the least possible cost. 
This applies to coal-fired power plants in China and India. Aid could help to 
upgrade the designs of the “standard” coal plant, for example from subcritical 
to supercritical. 
• Efficiency increases on the demand side, where the new middle-class buys 
appliances at lowest possible cost, not taking into account the lifetime energy 
costs. Air conditioners in China illustrate this challenge. US assistance has 
played a key role in promoting dissemination of compact fluorescent lamp 
and air conditioner standards in several countries. The most successful 
example is the energy efficiency program in Thailand during the early 1990s. 
• Moving up the energy ladder frees up renewable energy feedstock – e.g. cow 
dung in India currently being used as domestic solid fuel could generate 
methane for decentralized rural power plants. 
• Technology diffusion from industrialized countries could allow domestic 
cheap renewable energy generation. This has been achieved concerning wind 
turbines in India where Danish assistance helped to set up the first domestic 
turbine producers. 
 
Success in these activities would be crucial in showing developing countries that 
climate policy is not a ploy to stop them from catching up with the industrialized 
world. If one sees development in a broader sense as helping the world to tackle 
difficult long-term challenges, then the use of development assistance would be 
justified. But pretending that this assistance primarily aims at and yields poverty 
reduction would be far from the reality. Using ODA to finance these activities while 
pretending that ODA is focused on progress towards the MDGs will artificially blow 
up the input side while creating little benefits in terms of the output indicators for 
the different goals and targets. This will make aid appear even less effective than 
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today, once the final evaluation of the MDGs is made in 2015. In order to increase 
transparency and to avoid the risk of further aid fatigue, financing should not come 
from ODA but from new budget lines.  
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5.  Conclusions 
 
We observe some complementarities, but even more conflicts between the 
objectives of promoting short- and medium term poverty alleviation and mitigation 
of climate change. Most climate-change related assistance flows into medium-
income, emerging economies, and only addresses poverty alleviation indirectly, if at 
all. The CDM as a market mechanism will not contribute substantially to poverty 
alleviation either.  
 
We would urge the development community to openly recognize these potential 
conflicts. The two objectives must be weighted, and priorities must be defined. In 
the framework of ODA, the clearly defined priority is on poverty. It should be 
ensured that only those climate policy related activities can be ODA financed which 
have a high positive impact on poverty reduction. This is at odds with the current 
DAC definition which defines diversion of ODA funds only in the context of CERs. 
While there are valid reasons for long-term collaboration with emerging economies 
on greenhouse gas mitigation, there should be a separate budget line for such 
activities to avoid “obfuscation” of a decline of resources aimed at poverty 
alleviation. 
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